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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In this appeal, Bernadino Jose Avoran Duran asserts the district court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress. The arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to justify
the detention of Mr. Duran.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Matthew Guzman of the Twin Falls Police
Department testified he had been patrolling high crime or high drug areas in the early morning
hours of December 26, 2017. (See Tr. Mar. 12, 2018 (hereinafter, Tr.), p.11, L.19 – p.13, L.8.)
Based on the officer’s testimony, the district court found he had been a police officer for about
three years, had gone through the POST Academy, and had taken courses on identifying when
somebody is under the influence of drugs and on DUI. (See Tr., p.37, Ls.11-18.)
Officer Guzman testified it was a snowy evening, and around 1:09 am, he saw a male on
a sidewalk look in the direction of a marked police car before walking a bike across the roadway.
(See Tr., p.13, Ls.13-23, p.15, Ls.20-22.) He testified that a nearby apartment complex was
known to be a high drug traffic area, and search warrants had been issued in reference to people
selling drugs from there. (See Tr., p.13, Ls.6-13, p.16, L.17 – p.18, L.2.) The district court
found the officer “had specific, articulable facts to know that this was both a high crime and a
high drug area,” and he “knew that in the apartment complex where the defendant appeared to be
coming away from there had been search warrants issued for apartments in that complex.”
(Tr., p.37, Ls.19-24.)
The officer testified on cross-examination that he approached the male, Mr. Duran,
without activating the overhead lights on his patrol car, but with the car’s rear emergency lights
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activated. (See Tr., p.19, Ls.2-14.) During his conversation with Mr. Duran, he asked for and
received Mr. Duran’s identification, and he held onto it throughout the incident. (See Tr., p.19,
Ls.15-22.) Officer Guzman ran Mr. Duran’s information through dispatch, and while he was
waiting for a warrants check, Officer Justin Clark arrived at the scene. (See Tr., p.19, L.23 –
p.20, L.4.)
On direct examination, the State played a video recording of Officer Guzman’s body
camera footage from the incident.

(State’s Ex. 1; see Tr., p.15, L.25 – p.16, L.15.)

Officer Guzman testified: “When I first approached Mr. Duran and began talking to him, with
his nervous behavior and his hands, he had – he was unable to control his hands. As you see in
the video he keeps moving them around in a fidgety manner. People that exhibit signs of
methamphetamine use usually have the inability to control small hand movements or anything to
that effect.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.8-14.) The district court found that the video showed that Mr. Duran
was exhibiting behavior which, in the officer’s opinion, might indicate that Mr. Duran was under
the influence of drugs. (See Tr., p.38, Ls.20-25.)
The officer then explained why he asked to search Mr. Duran’s person: “Based on his
fidgety movements I believed he could become unpredictable, as far as if he had any weapons.”
(Tr., p.17, Ls.18-20.) When Officer Guzman asked Mr. Duran if he had any weapons, he put his
hands in his pockets and stated he had a knife. (See Tr., p.17, Ls.20-21.) The officer testified he
“searched him for weapons, and then based on his behavior I asked him if I could search his
pockets.” (Tr., p.17, Ls.21-23.) Mr. Duran consented to those searches. (See R., pp.12-13.) On
redirect examination, Officer Guzman testified Mr. Duran was not free to leave “[a]t the moment
when I located the methamphetamine out of his pocket – or should I say the meth pipes.”
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(Tr., p.22, Ls.14-16.) Along with the methamphetamine pipes with residue inside, the officer
also found marijuana in Mr. Duran’s wallet, after Mr. Duran told him about it. (See R., p.13.)
The State charged Mr. Duran by Information with one count of possession of a controlled
substance, felony, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1), for methamphetamine and/or amphetamine, and one
count of possession of a controlled substance, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2732(c), for marijuana.
(R., pp.21-23.) He entered a not guilty plea. (R., p.26.)
Mr. Duran subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support
Thereof. (R., pp.32-39.) He requested the district court issue “an order to suppress all evidence
seized as the result of an illegal seizure and search in the instant case,” in reliance “on the 4th, 5th,
6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1 Sections 13 and 17 of the Idaho
Constitution and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b).” (R., p.32.) He framed the issue as: “Were
officers justified in detaining Mr. Duran by retaining his identification and activating overhead
patrol car lights where Mr. Duran was pushing his bicycle at 1:09 am in a reportedly high crime
area and appeared anxious and restless while talking to police?”1 (R., p.34.)
Mr. Duran asserted his “‘inability to relax’ and his appearance of being ‘overly anxious’
and ‘fidgety’ all have innocent explanations.” (R., p.37.) “His excess movement could be
explained by nervousness or by trying to move around to keep warm.” (R., p.37.) Further,
“Mr. Duran also explained to the officer that he was anxious to get home because his legs were
swelling from gout.” (R., p.37.) He asserted, “Similarly, the fact that Mr. Duran was in an
allegedly ‘high crime area where drug activity was prevalent’ has little value in establishing
reasonable suspicion as there are undoubtedly many innocent people living around Dierkes Street
and 3rd Avenue West.” (R., p.37.)

1

Mr. Duran did not assert that he was detained at the start of the incident.
3

Mr. Duran then asserted, “A detention occurs when an officer retains a driver’s license or
other paperwork of value.” (R., p.37 (citing State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844 (2004); State v.
Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 492 (1992); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 439 (Ct. App. 2001)).)
Additionally, Mr. Duran asserted that Officer Clark had activated his overhead lights when he
arrived. (See R., p.34.) While Mr. Duran was not a motorist, “the overhead lights would likely
signal he was not free to leave at the time he granted permission to search,” and “his
identification was taken well before the time the officer received permission to search
Mr. Duran.” (R., p.37.) Thus, Mr. Duran asserted his detention “was not based on reasonable
suspicion but rather on a mere hunch. Because the evidence was obtained as a result of this
unconstitutional seizure, the evidence should be suppressed as ‘fruit of the poisonous tree.’”
(R., p.38 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)).)
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties acknowledged the search at issue
here was warrantless. (See Tr., p.6, Ls.15-19.) Alongside the testimony of Officer Guzman and
his body camera footage, the district court considered the testimony of Officer Clark and a video
recording of that officer’s body camera footage. (See Tr., p.23, L.10 – p.28, L.3; Def. Ex. A.)
Officer Clark testified he had also only activated his rear emergency lights during the incident.
(See Tr., p.24, L.18 – p.27, L.20.)
The State then argued, “If there is a detention the state thinks that we met our burden of
proving that it’s reasonable and justified under the legal standards applicable to this case and we
would ask that this motion be denied.” (Tr., p.32, Ls.19-22.) The State contended the officers
could have been investigating whether Mr. Duran was in violation of the statute requiring use of
a bicycle headlight after dark, or whether he was under the influence of controlled substances in
public. (See Tr., p.31, L.14 – p.32, L.16.)
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Mr. Duran asserted, “the bicycle light issue was never addressed by the officer.”
(Tr., p.35, Ls.21-22.) He also asserted that “under the case law this nervous type of behavior and
moving around is just simply not a basis for stopping people, otherwise people who have nervous
ticks or anxiety or excessively nervous would be always subject to police detention.” (Tr., p.36,
Ls.21-25.)
As indicated above, in its findings of fact, the district court highlighted Officer Guzman’s
training, the officer’s knowledge that the incident was in a high crime and high drug area, the
officer’s knowledge of search warrants issued for the nearby apartment complex, and the timing
of the incident after 1:00 am. (See Tr., p.37, L.7 – p.38, L.1.) The district court found, “The
officer was suspicious that the suspect, or the defendant now, was under the influence of drugs or
perhaps was possessing drugs, both of which would constitute a crime.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.2-5.)
However, “The officer was not suspicious that the defendant, Mr. Duran, was violating a law that
requires him to have a light on his bicycle.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.6-8.)
Under the totality of the circumstances, the district court found that “the detention was an
investigatory detention that was based upon specific articulable facts and rational inferences
drawn from those facts.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.11-14.) The district court referenced State v. Fairchild,
429 P.3d 877 (Ct. App. 2018), where the Idaho Court of Appeals had reiterated “the existing law
that a determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent
conduct.” (See Tr., p.38, Ls.15-19.) As indicated above, the district court then determined:
“The conduct that the court observed on Exhibit No. 1, the first tape that was played, showed that
Mr. Duran was exhibiting behavior which in the officer’s opinion at that time and that place and
based on his training and experience and other knowledge might indicate that the defendant was
under the influence of drugs.” (Tr., p.38, Ls.20-25.)
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The district court continued: “So the initial investigatory stop, which I believe did ripen
into a detention, but, again, the detention was not based on a mere hunch.” (Tr., p.38, L.25 –
p.39, L.4.) According to the district court, “From my observation of Mr. Duran’s behavior on
the video it’s true that the behavior that he was exhibiting could have been innocent, but on the
other hand, it might not have been innocent.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.5-8.) The district court stated, “As I
saw Mr. Duran’s behavior, he was doing things like pulling off his gloves and blowing on his
hands to warm them up, but he was also engaging in hand movements which the officer said that
he knew from his training and experience might be an indication that he was under the influence
of drugs.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.9-14.) Thus, the district court found “that the motion to suppress is
denied and for the reasons that I’ve stated.” (Tr., p.39, Ls.15-16.)
Pursuant to a conditional plea agreement that reserved his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Duran agreed to plead guilty to both counts. (See
R., pp.43-53, 56-58.) The district court accepted Mr. Duran’s guilty plea. (R., p.43.) The
district court subsequently imposed, for the possession of methamphetamine count, a unified
sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 2 (R., pp.62-65.)
Mr. Duran filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of
Conviction, Order Retaining Jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-75; see R., pp.79-83 (Amended Notice
of Appeal).)

2

For the possession of marijuana count, the district court imposed a sentence of seventy-seven
days in jail. (R., p.62.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Duran’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Duran’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Duran asserts the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress, because

his detention was unlawful.

A limited detention occurred when Officer Guzman took and

retained Mr. Duran’s identification. Under the totality of the circumstances here, the officer did
not have reasonable suspicion to justify that detention.

Thus, the detention and following

warrantless search were unlawful, and the evidence obtained thereby should have
been suppressed.

B.

Standard Of Review And Applicable Law
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated. An appellate court defers

to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and freely reviews
the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Hankey,
134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 17 of the
Idaho Constitution preserve the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho Const.
art. I, § 17. Their purpose “is to protect Idaho citizens’ reasonable expectation of privacy against
arbitrary governmental intrusion.” State v. Christensen, 131 Idaho 143, 146 (1998). Evidence
obtained in violation of these constitutional protections generally may not be used as evidence
against the victim of the illegal government action. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810-11
(2009) (discussing the Fourth Amendment).

This exclusionary rule “applies to evidence
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obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence discovered through the
exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous tree.” Id. at 811.
Warrantless searches or seizures are presumptively unreasonable under both the federal
and Idaho constitutions unless they come within one of the established exceptions to the warrant
requirement. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho
293, 295 (1988). “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State
bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable.”
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).
One such exception is for “brief investigatory detentions.” See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811
(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)).

“To determine whether such seizures are

reasonable, courts first ask ‘whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception.’” Id.
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.). “Next, they consider whether the action was ‘reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Id.
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20.)
“Typically, seizures must be based on probable cause to be reasonable.” Id. (citing
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983)). “However, limited investigatory detentions,
based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.” Id. (citing
Royer, 460 U.S. at 498). “Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and
the rational inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” Id. “The quantity and quality of
information necessary to establish reasonable suspicion is less than that necessary to establish
probable cause.” Id. “Still, reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere hunch or ‘inchoate
and unparticularized suspicion.’” Id. (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).
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Whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated “upon the totality of the
circumstances then known to the officer.” State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983 (2003).

C.

The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify The Detention Of Mr. Duran
Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Guzman did not have reasonable

suspicion to justify the detention of Mr. Duran at the time he took and retained his identification.

1.

A Limited Detention Occurred When The Officer Took And Retained
Mr. Duran’s Identification

As a preliminary matter, a limited detention occurred when Officer Guzman took and
retained Mr. Duran’s identification to perform a warrants check. The district court determined
that “the initial investigatory stop . . . did ripen into a detention . . . .”3 (See Tr., p.38, L.25 –
p.39, L.2.) Here, the parties acknowledged the search of Mr. Duran was warrantless. (See
Tr., p.6, Ls.15-19.)

By implication, any preceding detention or seizure of Mr. Duran was

also warrantless.
Like Mr. Duran asserted before the district court (see R., p.37), the Idaho Supreme Court
addressed this kind of scenario in State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004). In Page, the officer
approached the defendant while he was walking down the middle of a street around 2:00 am,
asked for identification, and took the defendant’s driver’s license back to the officer’s vehicle to
check his name with dispatch. See id. at 842-43. The district court granted the defendant’s
motion to suppress “on the basis that [the defendant] was unlawfully seized at the point in time
when [the officer] secured his driver’s license and ran his name through dispatch to check for
outstanding warrants.” Id. at 844. The Page Court observed, “This Court has previously held

3

An investigatory stop is a detention. See, e.g., State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 525-26
(Ct. App. 1991).
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that a limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s license or other paperwork
of value.”4 Id. (citing State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493 (1992); State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho
436, 439 (Ct. App. 2001)). Thus, a limited detention occurred when Officer Guzman took and
retained Mr. Duran’s identification to perform a warrants check.

2.

The Officer Did Not Have Reasonable Suspicion To Justify The Detention

Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Guzman did not have reasonable
suspicion to justify this detention of Mr. Duran.

As discussed above, whether an officer

possessed reasonable suspicion is evaluated “upon the totality of the circumstances then known
to the officer.” Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983.
Based on the testimony and other evidence presented at the motion to suppress hearing,
the district court specifically found that, at the time of the incident: (1) Officer Guzman had
been a police officer for about three years; (2) the officer had been through the POST Academy,
and had taken courses on identifying when somebody is under the influence of drugs and on
DUI; (3) the incident was in a high crime and high drugs area; (4) there had been search warrants
issued for apartments in the complex from which Mr. Duran appeared to be coming; (5) it was
after 1:00 am; (6) the officer was suspicious that Mr. Duran was under the influence of drugs or
was in possession of drugs; and (7) Mr. Duran was exhibiting behavior, such as hand
movements, that the officer believed based on his training and experience might indicate he was
under the influence of drugs. (See Tr., p.37, L.11 – p.39, L.14.)

4

The Page Court ultimately held that the defendant was improperly detained at the point the
officer seized the identification to perform a warrants check, but the discovery of an outstanding
warrant for the defendant’s arrest was an intervening circumstance which permitted the officer to
arrest the defendant and made the subsequent seizure of evidence admissible. See Page, 140
Idaho at 845-47.
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Mr. Duran submits that, under the totality of the circumstances as found by the district
court, Officer Guzman did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had committed, or
was about to commit, a crime. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811; Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983. At
best, the above facts would have provided the officer with a mere hunch, or inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion. See Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811.
Under the totality of the circumstances here, Officer Guzman did not have reasonable
suspicion to justify the detention of Mr. Duran. Thus, the detention and following warrantless
search were unlawful, and the evidence obtained thereby should have been suppressed. See id. at
810-11. The district court erred when it denied Mr. Duran’s motion to suppress, because his
detention was unlawful.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Duran respectfully requests that this Court vacate his
judgment of conviction and reverse the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 1st day of February, 2019.

/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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